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Outsourcing Service Fair Payment based on
Blockchain and its Applications in Cloud
Computing
Yinghui Zhang, Member, IEEE, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE,
Ximeng Liu, Member, IEEE , and Dong Zheng
Abstract—As a milestone in the development of outsourcing services, cloud computing enables an increasing number of individuals
and enterprises to enjoy the most advanced services from outsourcing service providers. Because online payment and data security
issues are involved in outsourcing services, the mutual distrust between users and service providers may severely impede the wide
adoption of cloud computing. Nevertheless, most existing solutions only consider a specific type of services and rely on a trusted
third-party to realize fair payment. In this paper, to realize secure and fair payment of outsourcing services in general without relying on
any third-party, trusted or not, we introduce BPay, an outsourcing service fair payment framework based on blockchain in cloud
computing. We first propose the system architecture, adversary model and design goals of BPay, then describe the design details. Our
security and compatibility analysis indicates that BPay achieves soundness and robust fairness and it is compatible with the Bitcoin
blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain. The key to the robust fairness and compatibility lies in an all-or-nothing checking-proof
protocol and a top-down checking method. In addition, our experimental results show that BPay is computationally efficient. Finally, we
present the applications of BPay in outsourcing services.
Index Terms—Bitcoin blockchain, Ethereum, fair payment, provable data possession, searchable encryption, outsourcing computation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE advent of cloud computing realizes the businessmodel of everything-as-a-service. In the model, a va-
riety of resources are offered as outsourcing services in an
economical, scalable and flexible manner that is affordable
and attractive to small businesses and individual consumers
[1]. Particularly, as two important types of outsourcing
services in the cloud, storage and computations are widely
available for users in practice. For example, Amazon S3
offers flexible storage services, Amazon EC2 allows users
to customize computing capacity, and Google cloud platfor-
m offers services including storage, computation and net-
working. Although cloud computing enables users to enjoy
outsourcing services of flexibility, high efficiency and high
availability, data security and privacy issues are still main
concerns of users, which may impede the wide deployment
of the cloud [2]. Take outsourcing storage and computations
as examples. In cloud storage, besides data access control,
the integrity assurance of outsourced data is required by
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users because cloud service providers may not be fully
trustworthy. As for computation, users are reluctant to pay
the service fee if the computation result returned by the
outsourcing service provider is incorrect.
Recently, great efforts have been made to realize fine-
grained data access control [3], [4], [5], provable data pos-
session (PDP) [6], [7], searchable encryption [8], [9], [10], and
verifiable outsourcing computation [11], [12], [13]. These
techniques, while can be useful to ensure the data storage
security and computation correctness, cannot address all the
security threats in cloud computing, since most of them
do not consider payment fairness issues of outsourcing
services. As an example scenario, in the challenge proof of
PDP, a user’s data integrity may be violated without any
compensation even if he/she has paid for the service. On
the other hand, the server may fail to earn the service fee
from the user even if he/she correctly enforces the PDP
service. In outsourcing computation, after accomplishing
the computing task from a user, the server wants to get the
service fee before returning the computation results to the
user. However, what the user expects is to obtain and check
the computation results first and then pay the service fee
only if the computation is correct. Accordingly, if the user
and the server distrust each other, the payment issues are
extremely challenging for outsourcing services considering
fairness.
In fact, to simultaneously address the payment issues,
most existing schemes adopt the (default) traditional pay-
ment mechanism and rely on a trusted third-party such as
a bank. For instance, the registration of the Google cloud
platform requires a bank account details [14]. In cloud
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computing, however, the traditional payment solution suf-
fers several drawbacks. First, it is assumed that the bank
is trustworthy and it deals with all procedures in a fair
manner. Second, the payment mechanism may become a
bottleneck in that it needs to be adapted to different banks
used by users and outsourcing service providers and has to
be updated whenever they change. Last but not least, users’
privacy associated with bank accounts may be violated.
Most recently, blockchain technologies have received
great attention because they can be operated without
the control of any single party. In particular, the Bitcoin
blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain are the top two
blockchains in terms of market capitalization. Based on
blockchain technologies, it is possible to directly transfer
value in the form of cryptocurrency between two parties
and no third-party is needed. However, to the best of
our knowledge, blockchain technologies have seldom been
used in a general and fair manner for outsourcing service
payment in cloud computing.
1.1 Our Contribution
To eliminate the third-party, trusted or not, while ensuring
fairness of payment against malicious users and malicious
outsourcing service providers, we introduce BPay, an out-
sourcing service payment framework based on blockchain
in cloud computing. Our contributions are three-fold:
1) We first present the system architecture, definition, ad-
versary model and design goals of BPay, then describe
its design details. Based on the collision-resistance of
hash functions and the unforgeability of the elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), we prove
that BPay achieves soundness and robust fairness where
the latter implies that fairness is resilient to any attacks
including eavesdropping and malleability attacks with-
out relying on any third-party. In BPay, robust fairness
is achieved by an all-or-nothing checking-proof proto-
col, in which each party is forced to behave honestly.
Specifically, the all-or-nothing property ensures that the
outsourcing service provider either earns the service
fee and gets his/her guaranty back or loses everything
depending on whether it provided correct services or
not.
2) Our compatibility analysis shows that BPay is com-
patible with the Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum
blockchain, which are the two most widely used
blockchains in practice. The compatibility of BPay is
realized based on a top-down checking method. The
method can realize service checking and payment with-
out requiring more powerful scripts, such as string
concatenation script, than those supported by Bitcoin
blockchain. Besides, our experimental results show that
BPay is computationally efficient.
3) As illustrative applications of BPay in cloud-based out-
sourcing services, we further propose a blockchain-
based dynamic provable data possession scheme,
a blockchain-based searchable symmetric encryption
scheme and a blockchain-based outsourcing computa-
tion protocol.
1.2 Related Work
Blockchain has recently gained prominent popularity most-
ly due to its distributed nature. As an earlier and suc-
cessful application of blockchain technologies, Bitcoin was
announced under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto [15].
To expand the potential uses of blockchain technologies,
Buterin [16] proposed Ethereum, a next-generation smart
contract and decentralized application platform. Bonneau et
al. [17] provided the first systematic exposition of Bitcoin
and many related cryptocurrencies. Andrychowicz et al.
[18] proposed secure multiparty lottery protocols based
on the Bitcoin blockchain, in which a bitcoin-based timed
commitment scheme serves as the main ingredient. In order
to realize more general computation, Andrychowicz et al.
[19] proposed a two-party computation protocol, which is
not compatible with the Bitcoin blockchain because it mod-
ifies the Bitcoin specification to resist malleability attacks.
Similar ideas were developed independently by Bentov et
al. [20]. Note that all these schemes do not consider the
all-or-nothing property and the top-down checking which
are required in outsourcing services. The research work on
outsourcing service mainly consists of outsourcing storage
and outsourcing computation.
As for outsourcing storage, much effort has been ded-
icated to fine-grained access control on cloud storage [4],
[5], [21], [22]. Besides, Ateniese et al. firstly [6] proposed a
PDP scheme that allows a user to challenge the untrusted
cloud server for a data integrity proof without retrieving it.
In the same year, Juels et al. [23] introduced the notion of
proofs of retrievability, which enables the untrusted cloud
server to present a concise proof that a user can retrieve
a target file. Later, in order to realize public verification
of outsourced data, Ateniese et al. [24] proposed a PDP
scheme based on identification protocols. Many other PDP
schemes are focusing on data dynamics [25], [26], [27], [28],
ID-based construction [7], [29], and offline computation [30].
To realize keyword search on remote encrypted data, Song
et al. [8] proposed the first searchable encryption scheme
in the symmetric setting, in which each word is encrypted
independently under a two-layer encryption construction.
Curtmola et al. [9] first considered the adaptive security of
searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) and presented two
index-based schemes. In order to resist selfish cloud servers,
Kurosawa et al. [10] first proposed a verifiable searchable
symmetric encryption scheme based on [9]. The scheme
is proven secure against active adversaries and enables
the user to verify the validness of search results. On the
other hand, outsourcing computation technologies enable
resource-constrained users to complete computationally ex-
pensive tasks with the help of cloud servers. In a commercial
setting, outsourcing computation introduces the potential
for cheating by untrusted participants. For example, the
server may try to earn the computation service fee without
returning valid computation results. To protect the rights
and interests of honest participants, security models for
outsourcing distributed computation are proposed [11], [31],
[32]. Monrose et al. [31] adopted computation proofs to
ensure correct server behaviors. The concept of ringer [11]
and the idea of duplicating computation [32] are intro-
duced to verify the validness of outsourcing computation.
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In order to improve efficiency, Du et al. [33] presented a
commitment-based scheme to prevent servers from cheat-
ing. Gennaro et al. [12] proposed a verifiable outsourcing
computation scheme while protecting the input and output
privacy. Carbunar et al. [34] proposed several outsourcing
computation solutions that simultaneously ensure correct
remuneration for computation tasks completed on time and
prevent servers’ laziness. Chen et al. [35] considered out-
sourcing computation with such servers that may not send
the computation results on time. There are also some work-
s proposing solutions to verifiable outsourcing attribute-
based encryption [36], [37], [38] and verifiable outsourcing
of polynomial evaluation [13].
TABLE 1
Comparison of outsourcing service-related schemes.
Schemes No Bank N-TTP Application Compatibility(Blockchain-based) PDP SSE OC Bitcoin Ethereum
DJMM04 [33]     X    
BM12 [34]     X    
CLS12 [35]     X    
LWZH17 [38]     X    
AGLP17 [39] X  X    
LZHT17 [40] X X  X   
HCWH18 [41] X    X  
Our BPay X X X X X X X
y
N-TTP: No Trusted-Third Party; PDP: Provable Data Possession; SSE: Searchable Symmetric
Encryption; OC: Outsourcing Computation.
Note that, all the above schemes are bank-dependent.
To be specific, either the payment issue is not taken into
account or the (default) traditional payment framework
is adopted, which means a trusted third-party has to be
introduced for fair payment. To solve these problems in
outsourcing services, blockchain technologies have been
taken into account. Compared to traditional payment tech-
nologies, the key advantage of blockchain-based solutions
is the independence from central authorities. Ateniese et al.
[39] introduced accountable storage based on an extension
of invertible Bloom filters, and showed how to combine it
with Bitcoin by using zero-knowledge proofs. However, the
combination involves a trusted third-party called Bitcoin
arbitrator. Li et al. [40] proposed a blockchain-based SSE
scheme, which requires the miners of the blockchain to
do some particular tasks, such as decryption, and hence
violates the Bitcoin specification. Huang et al. [41] proposed
a blockchain-based outsourcing computation scheme, in
which a trusted third-party is still required. Obviously, all
these schemes [39], [40], [41] cannot truly realize blockchain-
based decentralized outsourcing services. As shown in Table
1, we make a comparison of outsourcing service-related
schemes. Obviously, only BPay simultaneously enables fair
payment in provable data possession, searchable symmetric
encryption, and outsourcing computation, which is compat-
ible with Bitcoin and Ethereum. Our solution can address
the threat of cheating and offer guarantees that the service
has been correctly enforced.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some prelim-
inaries are given in Section 2. We then present the system
architecture, definition and adversary model in Section 3.
The proposed framework BPay is presented in Section 4.
Security analysis and performance evaluation are given in
Tx2(in: Tx1)
in-script: sigA([Tx2])
out-script(body, σ): verB(body, σ)
val: dB
tlock: t
dB
dB
Fig. 1. An example of transaction.
Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section
6. Besides, the compatibility and transactions of BPay are
discussed in the Supplemental Material A. Several decen-
tralized applications of BPay in cloud computing are given
in the Supplemental Material B. Note that the main body
of this paper has the technical completeness without the
supplemental material.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give some notations in Table 2 and briefly
review blockchains and Bitcoin-based timed commitments.
TABLE 2
Notations used in BPay.
C The client Di The i-th data block in data1
S The server
Ii;j
The hash value of the j-th node
H A hash function with height i in T`
rS The secret of S root The ECDSA signature ofhS The hash value H(rS) the root of T`
t A time-lock chal A challenge-related set usedT` A service data tree in the service checking
` The height of T` nchal The size of chal
(pkA; skA) An ECDSA key pair of A sv The outsourcing service
data0 Service-related local data ChalIndex A challenge-related index set
data1 The outsourcing data
maxB
The maximal delay between
chaldata A challenge (data indexes) broadcasting a transaction and
chali;j An element in chal including it on the blockchain
2.1 Blockchain
The blockchain is an essential technology behind many
cryptocurrencies, with Bitcoin and Ethereum as the two
most widely used ones. The idea of the blockchain is that the
longest chain is accepted as the proper one. In the following,
we describe blockchain in terms of the Bitcoin currency
system, including addresses and transactions.
As an important ingredient of the Bitcoin system, the
ECDSA signature is associated with a public-secret key pair
(pk; sk). Technically, an address is a hash of a public key
pk. To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we use pk
to represent an address. Suppose a user A has a key pair
(pkA; skA), then sigA(m) denotes the ECDSA signature on
a message m associated with skA, and verA(m;) denotes
the result of the verification of the ECDSA signature  on
the message m with regard to pkA. The most general form
of a Bitcoin transaction Txx is
((y1; a1; 1);    ; (yn; an; n); (v1; 1);    ; (vm; m); t):
The inputs of Txx are triples (y1; a1; 1);    ; (yn; an; n),
where yi is the hash of some previous transaction Txyi ,
ai is an index of the output of Txyi and i is called
an input script. The outputs of Txx are a list of pairs
(v1; 1);    ; (vm; m), where vi is the value of the i-th
output of Txx and i is an output script. In particular, t
is a time-lock, which means that Txx is valid only if time t is
reached. In Ethereum, similar mechanisms can be realized
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based on the Ethereum Alarm Clock [42]. Furthermore, the
body of Txx is denoted as
[Txx] = ((y1; a1);    ; (yn; an); (v1; 1);    ; (vm; m); t);
which is equal to Txx without the input script. The trans-
action Txx is valid if 0i([Txx]; i) evaluates to true for
1  i  n, where 0i is the output script of the ai-th output
of Txyi . The scripts are written in the Bitcoin scripting
language, which is a stack-based, not Turing-complete lan-
guage. In Figure 1, as an example of transactions, the user A
aims to transfer dB from Tx1 to the user B after time t based
on Tx2, where the output script is an ECDSA signature
verification. Similar to [18], [19], to keep the exposition
simple we present our results assuming that the transaction
fees are zero.
2.2 Bitcoin-based Timed Commitment
In BPay, the bitcoin-based timed commitment scheme [18]
is used, which is also adopted by [39], [40], [41]. The
commitment scheme is denoted by CS(S; C; d; t; s) and is
executed between S and C, where the outsourcing service
provider S acts as a committer and the outsourcing service
client C acts as a receipt. Concretely, S commits to a secret s
and has to open the commitment before a specific time t to
get his/her deposit of value d back. Otherwise, the deposit
will be given to C. The commitment scheme consists of three
phases: the commitment phase CS:Commit(S; C; d; t; s), the
opening phase CS:Open(S; C; d; t; s) and the punishment
phase CS:Fine(S; C; d; t; s). Note that the punishment phase
is performed only if the opening phase is not correctly per-
formed. Three transactions TxCommit, TxOpen and TxFine,
as shown in Figure 2, are involved in the commitment phase,
the opening phase and the punishment phase, respectively.
In Figure 2, the omitted arguments of scripts are denoted by
? and H is a hash function.
TxFine(in: TxCommit)
in-script: sigS([TxFine]),
sigC([TxFine]), ⊥
out-script(body, σ):
verC(body, σ)
val: dB
tlock: t
TxCommit(in: T )
in-script: sigS([TxCommit])
out-script(body, σ1, σ2, x):
(verS(body, σ1) ∧H(x) = h) ∨
(verS(body, σ1) ∧ verR(body, σ2))
val: dB
TxOpen(in: TxCommit)
in-script:
sigS([TxOpen]), ⊥, s
out-script(body, σ):
verS(body, σ)
val: dB
dB
dB dB
dB dB
Fig. 2. The transactions involved in bitcoin-based timed commitments.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, DEFINITION AND AD-
VERSARY MODEL
In this section, we first propose the system architecture and
definition of BPay. Then, the adversary model and design
goals of BPay are described in detail.
3.1 System Architecture of BPay
The system architecture of BPay is illustrated in Figure 3,
and it involves clients (i.e., users), servers (i.e., outsourcing
service providers) and a blockchain. In the rest of this paper,
we use C and S to denote a client and a server, respectively.
Suppose C plans to subscribe an outsourcing service sv from
S . To keep the presentation compact, we only show the
main procedures of BPay in Figure 3. The procedures (1),
(2), (3.1) and (3.2) are used to implement sv. The procedures
(4), (5), (6.1) and (6.2) are used to check the sv (partial)
implementation and the result is reflected in the (partial)
service payment (7) or the service claim (8). The details are
given as follows:
 Client C: As a user, C subscribes sv from S . After sv is
enforced by S , C can get a preliminary service confirma-
tion from S based on the blockchain. In order to check
the implementation of sv before the payment, C sends
a challenge to S . S first makes a claim commitment
to ensure that C will get enough compensation in the
form of deposits if S is malicious. Then, C and S jointly
initiate the service proof by specifying some require-
ments of sv. If S fails to provide a valid service proof
that the service implementation meets the requirements
before a specific time, C can claim enough deposits by
himself/herself from S . Note that the proof initiation
and the service payment are realized based on repeated
procedures including partial service implementation
checking and proof.
 Server S : As an outsourcing service provider, S aims
to earn service fees from C by enforcing sv subscribed
by C. Upon receiving the service subscription request
from C, S completes the enforcement of sv based on
the blockchain and sends a preliminary confirmation
message to C. Then, S makes the claim commitment af-
ter receiving the challenge from C. Once the joint proof
initiation is finished, S provides a valid service proof to
get the service fee from C in the service payment phase
before the specific time.
 Blockchain: A public blockchain is considered, such as
the Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain
which have been widely adopted in practice.
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Fig. 3. The system architecture of BPay.
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3.2 Definition of BPay
BPay consists of five phases: the system setup phase, the
service implementation phase, the service checking phase,
the service payment phase, and the service claim phase. The
first four phases are compulsory and the service claim phase
is performed by C only if S fails to provide a valid service
implementation proof.
3.2.1 System Setup Phase
C and S initialize some parameters such as unredeemed
transactions to be used in the subsequent phases.
3.2.2 Service Implementation Phase
sv is implemented based on three procedures: service sub-
scription, service enforcement and preliminary service con-
firmation, which are sequentially performed as below.
 Service Subscription: C subscribes sv from S by sending
service-related data to S .
 Service Enforcement: In this procedure, sv is enforced
by S . Upon receiving the subscription data from C,
S enforces sv. Then, S generates a digital signature
according to the enforcement of sv and stores the signa-
ture on the blockchain. Finally, S sends a confirmation
message to C that helps C to obtain the signature from
the blockchain.
 Preliminary Service Confirmation: After obtaining the
signature from the blockchain, C thinks that sv has
been preliminarily implemented, where “preliminarily”
means that the sv implementation will be checked by C
before the payment.
3.2.3 Service Checking Phase
In this phase, C and S jointly initiate the service check-
ing and specify the service requirements. Three sequential
sub-phases, challenge generation phase, claim commitment
phase and proof initiation phase, are performed as below.
 Challenge Generation Phase: In order to check the sv im-
plementation, C sends a challenge to S besides reaching
an agreement beforehand on service-related parameters
such as compensation and penalty of S in the case of
service failure.
 Claim Commitment Phase: S makes a commitment that
once the sv implementation does not meet the require-
ments specified in the Proof Initiation Phase and mali-
cious S refuses to compensate C in the Service Payment
Phase before a specific time, C is able to claim enough
deposits of S by himself/herself as a penalty in the
Service Claim Phase after the specific time.
 Proof Initiation Phase: C and S jointly initiate the service
checking by temporarily freezing a joint deposit consist-
s of (partial) service fee from C and (current) guaranty
from S , in which the (partial) requirements of sv are
agreed upon. After this phase, honest C can ensure
that either a valid (partial) sv is achieved in the Service
Payment Phase by paying the (partial) service fee or
enough deposits are claimed in the Service Claim Phase
no matter how S behaves. On the other hand, honest
S can ensure that if the (partial) sv implementation
is valid, he/she will earn the (partial) service fee no
matter how C behaves.
3.2.4 Service Payment Phase
This phase is performed by S to earn the (partial) service
fee from C by proving that the (partial) sv implementation
meets the (partial) requirements. Certainly, C can ensure that
the (partial) service fee is paid to S only if the (partial) sv
implementation is what is expected.
3.2.5 Service Claim Phase
Only if S fails to prove that the (partial) sv implementation
meets the (partial) requirements of C before a specific time,
BPay comes to the Service Claim Phase. In this phase, C can
claim enough deposits from S no matter how S behaves.
3.3 Adversary Model and Design Goals of BPay
In BPay, both C and S are of mutual distrust and they can be
malicious. Concretely, malicious C aims to enjoy sv provided
by S without paying the service fee, and malicious S wants
to get the service fee from C without implementing sv as
specified in the requirements of C. As for the blockchain, its
contents are publicly available and both C and S can verify
the authenticity of data on the blockchain.
In addition, no private channels are required in B-
Pay. Hence, eavesdropping attacks and malleability attacks
should be taken into consideration in which the adversary
aims to undermine the fairness in BPay.
 Eavesdropping Attacks: The adversary can eavesdrop on
the public channel to see the transactions sent by the
honest party, before they appear on the blockchain.
 Malleability Attacks: Based on the eavesdropping, the
adversary tries to invalid some transactions by modify-
ing their hash values without changing the semantics.
In BPay, our design goals mainly include soundness, robust
fairness and compatibility as below.
 Soundness (a.k.a. correctness, completeness) [33], [35], [41]:
If both C and S are honest, then C can obtain the
required service implementation and S can gain the
corresponding service fee.
 Robust Fairness: The fairness for S means that it is in-
feasible for malicious C to enjoy valid sv provided by S
without paying the service fee. In the case of malicious
S , the fairness for C means that it is infeasible for S to
get the service fee paid by C without providing a valid
sv implementation proof in terms of the requirements
of C before a specific time. Particularly, if malicious S
fails to provide such a proof, C is able to get enough
compensation or penalty from S . Robust fairness means
that the fairness is resilient to eavesdropping attacks
and malleability attacks, without needing a third-party.
 Compatibility: It is desirable for BPay to be compatible
with blockchains such as the Bitcoin blockchain and
the Ethereum blockchain, which are currently in wide
applications. Note that, based on the expressiveness of
scripts of Bitcoin and Ethereum, if BPay is compatible
with the Bitcoin blockchain, then it is compatible with
the Ethereum blockchain [16], [43], [44], [45]. It is ex-
tremely challenging to realize the compatibility with
the Bitcoin blockchain because the scripts of Bitcoin are
very limited [43]. For example, the string concatenation
is currently disabled in Bitcoin scripts.
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4 BPAY: OUTSOURCING SERVICE FAIR PAYMENT
FRAMEWORK BASED ON BLOCKCHAIN
4.1 High-level Description
According to the adversary model and design goals in
Section 3.3, the main challenges to design BPay include
robust fairness and compatibility.
4.1.1 Basic Idea for Robust Fairness
In the service implementation phase, S constructs a Merkle
tree based on the data from C and generates a signature
on the root of the tree. The signature is then stored on the
blockchain, which cannot be changed later and acts as a
“root of trust” in the service checking and payment. The
ingredient of ensuring robust fairness is an all-or-nothing
checking-proof protocol CPAON, in which repeated proce-
dures are performed in a top-down manner based on the
Merkle tree. The idea of CPAON lies in two aspects:
(1) S can earn service fees from C and get his/her guaranty
back only if he/she provides a valid service imple-
mentation proof in the service payment phase, denoted
as ServiceProofi;j , which is associated with a node
indexed by (i; j) in the data Merkle tree;
(2) If S fails to provide such a proof before a specific time,
C is able to claim from S either enough compensation
together with his/her service fee refund or enough fines
in the form of deposit.
To achieve these goals, in BPay, C and S jointly create
a deposit transaction TxProofIniti;j , which consists of the
service fee from C and the guaranty from S . In the normal
case, TxProofIniti;j can be completely redeemed by S based
on his/her signature and ServiceProofi;j , which ensures the
Soundness. If S cannot provide ServiceProofi;j , TxProofIniti;j
can be completely redeemed by C based on his/her signa-
ture and a secret rS from S . Because BPay does not use
private channels, ServiceProofi;j may be eavesdropped by
C before honest S gets the service fee. As a result, mali-
cious C can redeem TxProofIniti;j before honest S , which
violates (1) mentioned above. To overcome this problem, in
BPay, S just makes rS public after redeeming TxProofIniti;j .
Certainly, in this case, malicious S will not publicize rS
even if he/she fails to provide ServiceProofi;j , and hence C
cannot redeem TxProofIniti;j to claim compensation, which
violates (2) mentioned above. To tackle this issue, in BPay,
S is required to make a commitment to rS based on a
deposit transaction TxClaimCommitment. The commitment
must be opened by S before a specific time t to redeem
TxClaimCommitment. Otherwise, C can redeem TxClaim-
Commitment himself/herself as a punishment to S after
time t. Note that, the order among the involved transactions
and the use of rS make BPay malleability-resistant.
4.1.2 Basic Idea for Compatibility
The design of BPay is based on opcodes which are currently
allowed by scripts of blockchains widely used in practice,
such as the Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain.
Especially, in order to support the earliest and most famous
Bitcoin blockchain, the string operation concatenation can-
not be used in output scripts of transactions in BPay, which
poses a great challenge to the service checking based on
System Setup
S broadcasts TxClaimCommitment
S broadcasts TxServiceSig
C and S check if
TxServiceSig is confirmed
C quits
No
Challenge Generation
C and S
check if TxClaimCommitment
is confirmed
C quits
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Yes
S broadcasts TxProofIniti,j
C and S check if
TxProofIniti,j is confirmed
C quits
No
Yes
S broadcasts TxServiceFeei,j S broadcasts TxGuarantyi,j
C and S check if
TxServiceFeei,j and TxGuarantyi,j
Yes
No
are confirmed
C checks if
TxOpen is confirmed
No
Yes
C broadcasts TxRefund C broadcasts TxCompensation
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C quits
S broadcasts TxOpen
S quits
C quits
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Challenge Generation
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Sequentially: for (i, j) ∈ ChalIndex
traversed
Yes
No
Is ChalIndex
Fig. 4. A simplified relationship between phases of BPay and involved
transactions.
the “root of trust” in that concatenation is used in the con-
struction of the Merkle tree. To tackle this problem, in BPay,
C begins with the root and adopts a top-down checking
method to gradually check the service implementation proof
of S . Therefore, the above TxProofIniti;j and ServiceProofi;j
are associated with an index (i; j), which is determined by
the authentication path of challenge data in the Merkle tree.
4.2 Design Details of BPay
In order to achieve easy understanding and keep the expo-
sition simple, we present BPay following the style of Bitcoin
transactions in the same way as [18], [19], [39], [40], [41].
It’s noted that the framework idea of BPay obtains general
universality, and only the description of transactions is relat-
ed to concrete blockchains. Based on the later compatibility
analysis, it easily follows that it is straightforward to adapt
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the description of transactions and make BPay suitable for
other blockchains such as the Ethereum Blockchain.
Before describing the details of BPay, we first present
Figure 4, which is a simplified flowchart and reflects the
relationship between the concrete phases of BPay and in-
volved transactions. Now, we present the details of BPay.
4.2.1 System Setup Phase
Let H be a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-
256. A secure symmetric encryption algorithm should be
chosen for specified services if necessary, such as the PDP
service. C and S choose their own ECDSA public-secret key
pairs, denoted by (pkC ; skC) and (pkS ; skS), respectively.
S prepares an unredeemed transaction TxSsig of value dsig B,
which can be redeemed with skS .
4.2.2 Service Implementation Phase
The outsourcing service sv is implemented based on the
following three procedures.
 Service Subscription: C preprocesses service-related local
data data0 and sends the result data1 to S for sub-
scribing sv. Note that the preprocessing is specified
by concrete outsourcing services. For example, PDP
involves encryption and hashing. Without loss of gen-
erality, suppose data1 consists of n = 2` data blocks
and data1 = fD1; D2;    ; D2`g:
 Service Enforcement: Upon receiving the subscription
data data1 from C, S first enforces sv based on data1.
In order to prove the sv implementation to C and earn
the service fee in the subsequent phases, a Merkle tree
T` is built by S after the service enforcement, where `
denotes the height of the tree and the leaf nodes have a
height of 0. In T`, each interior node has a hash value.
For 1  i  ` , the j-th node of height i has a value
Ii;j = H(Ii 1;j k Ii 1;j+2i 1);
where Ii 1;j and Ii 1;j+2i 1 represent the hash values
of the left child and the right child of Ii;j , respectively.
Furthermore, if i = `, Ii;j = I`;1 is the root node, which
is also denoted by Iroot. If 1  i < ` and Ii;j is a left
child, then its right sibling is Ii;j+2i . Otherwise, Ii;j
is a right child and its left sibling is Ii;j 2i . If i = 0,
Ii;j = I0;j represents the j-th leaf and I0;j = Dj . As
an example, T3 is shown in Figure 5. Subsequently, S
computes a signature root = sigS(Iroot), and stores root
on the blockchain by broadcasting a service signature
transaction TxServiceSig shown in Figure 6. Here, root
is publicly output by TxServiceSig based on the opcode
OP RETURN. Finally, S sends the transaction ID to C.
 Preliminary Service Confirmation: Upon receiving the
transaction ID from S , C first locates TxServiceSig on
the blockchain and gets root from OP RETURN. Then,
C computes Iroot based on data1. If verS(Iroot; root) =
true, C thinks sv has been preliminarily implemented.
According to context of the concrete service under con-
sideration, C could immediately delete data1 or store
data1 till a successful service checking proof. In any
case, C should store metadata, such as the height ` for
static data1 or the structure of T` for the dynamic case,
which will be used to specify the service requirements.
I0,1 I0,2 I0,3 I0,4 I0,5 I0,6 I0,7 I0,8
I1,1 I1,3 I1,5 I1,7
I2,1 I2,5
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
I3,1 = Iroot
challenge blocks interior nodes or root
data blocks as leafs in data1, I0,k = Dk for 1 ≤ k ≤ 8
Fig. 5. The construction of T3 as an example.
TxServiceSig(in: TxSsig)
in-script: sigS([TxServiceSig])
out-script(body, σ): verS(body, σ)
val: dsig B
dsig B
σroot
Fig. 6. The service signature transaction TxServiceSig.
4.2.3 Service Checking Phase
In this phase, C and S jointly initiate the service checking
based on three sequential sub-phases the Challenge Gen-
eration Phase, the Claim Commitment Phase and the Proof
Initiation Phase. Suppose there is an unredeemed transaction
TxS0 of value d0 B, which can be redeemed by S and is used
as the penalty of S in the case of service failure.
 Challenge Generation Phase: To check the sv implemen-
tation, C sends a challenge chaldata to S , which spec-
ifies the data blocks to be challenged in T`. Suppose
chaldata = fk1; k2;    ; kcg; which sequentially spec-
ifies data blocks fDkjg1jc. For each k 2 chaldata,
denote by pathk the path from the leaf node I0;k to the
root Iroot of T`. Define path =
S
k2chaldata pathk, which
consists of nodes on the paths from leafs determined by
chaldata to the root. Define chal as the ordered version
of the set path  fDkgk2chaldata such that a node with a
larger first index and a smaller second index is placed
in the front. Formally, given Ii1;j1 ; Ii2;j2 2 chal, Ii1;j1 is
in the front of Ii2;j2 if i1 > i2 or (i1 = i2 ^ j1 < j2). We
denote chal = fchali;jg(i;j)2ChalIndex, where ChalIndex is
the index set of chal and it can be obtained by C based
on chaldata and the metadata of T`. According to the
definition of chal, for each chali;j 2 chal 
S
Ii;j2T` Ii;j ,
we have chali;j = Ii;j . In other words, there may exist
some Ii;j which is not in chal. For example, in Figure 5,
chaldata = (2; 5), I1;3 =2 chal and
path2 = fI0;2; I1;1; I2;1; I3;1g;
path5 = fI0;5; I1;5; I2;5; I3;1g;
path = fI0;2; I1;1; I2;1; I3;1; I0;5; I1;5; I2;5g;
chal = fchal3;1; chal2;1; chal2;5; chal1;1; chal1;5g
= fI3;1; I2;1; I2;5; I1;1; I1;5g;
ChalIndex = f(3; 1); (2; 1); (2; 5); (1; 1); (1; 5)g:
Most importantly, for 2  i  `, if Ii;j 2 chal, at leat
one child of Ii;j belongs to chal, which enables C to
specify partial requirements of the sv implementation
one by one1.
1. At the beginning, C does not know chal, but C can gradually get
elements in chal according to partial service proofs from S. Please refer
to the Proof Initiation Phase for more details.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, DOI: 10.1109/TSC.2018.2864191 8
TxRefund(in: TxProofIniti,j(1))
in-script: sigC([TxRefund]), rS
out-script(body, σ): verC(body, σ)
val: dCi,j B
int-script1: sigC([TxProofIniti,j ])
out-script1(body, σ, x):
(verC(body, σ) ∧H(x) = hS) ∨ (verS(body, σ) ∧ check(x, chali,j)
val: dCi,j B
int-script2: sigS([TxProofIniti,j ])
out-script2(body, σ, x):
(verS(body, σ) ∧ check(x, chali,j) ∨ (verC(body, σ) ∧H(x) = hS)
val: dSi,j B
TxGuarantyi,j(in: TxProofIniti,j(2))
in-script: sigS([TxGuarantyi,j ]), ServiceProofi,j
out-script(body, σ): verS(body, σ)
val: dSi,j B
TxProofIniti,j(in: Tx
C
i,j , Tx
S
i,j)
TxServiceFeei,j(in: TxProofIniti,j(1))
in-script: sigS([TxServiceFeei,j ]), ServiceProofi,j
out-script(body, σ): verS(body, σ)
val: dCi,j B
TxCompensation(in: TxProofIniti,j(2))
in-script: sigC([TxCompensation]), rS
out-script(body, σ): verC(body, σ)
val: dSi,j B
dCi,j B d
S
i,j B
dCi,j B d
S
i,j B
For (i, j) ∈ ChalIndex:
dSi,j Bd
C
i,j B
dCi,j B d
S
i,j B
dCi,j B d
S
i,j B
Fig. 8. The details of transactions in a partial service implementation checking and proof of BPay.
TxClaimCommitment(in: TxS
0
)
in-script: sigS([TxClaimCommitment])
out-script(body, σ1, σ2, x):
(verS(body, σ1) ∧H(x) = hS) ∨
(verS(body, σ1) ∧ verC(body, σ2))
val: d0 B
d0 B
d0 B
Fig. 7. The claim commitment transaction TxClaimCommitment.
Furthermore, for each (i; j) 2 ChalIndex, suppose there
are unredeemed transactions TxCi;j of value d
C
i;j B and
TxSi;j of value d
S
i;j B, which can be redeemed by C and S ,
respectively. In order to force S to compensate C before
a specific time once sv fails, let d0  dCi;j + dSi;j . Note
that, dCi;j B and d
S
i;j B denote the partial service fee of
C and the compensation of S in the case of a partial
service failure, respectively.
 Claim Commitment Phase: Upon receiving chaldata, S
performs CS:Commit(S; C; d0; t; rS), where t is a specif-
ic time and rS 2 f0; 1g. Specifically, S posts a deposit
transaction TxClaimCommitment of value d0 B on the
blockchain, which makes a commitment that once the
sv implementation does not meet the requirements
specified in the Proof Initiation Phase and malicious
S refuses2 to compensate C in the Service Payment
Phase before time t, C is able to claim d0 B of S by
himself/herself as a penalty in the Service Claim Phase
after time t. After TxClaimCommitment is included
on the blockchain, S creates the body of the punish-
ment transaction TxFine, which will be used by C to
claim the penalty, signs it and sends the signed body
sigS([TxFine]) to C. The details of TxClaimCommitment
are shown in Figure 7, where hS = H(rS). TxOpen and
TxFine will be detailed in the Service Payment Phase and
the Service Claim Phase, respectively. Certainly, if the sv
2. Refusing to compensate means that S does not redeem TxClaim-
Commitment based on the opening transaction TxOpen before time t,
that is, rS is not revealed by S before time t.
implementation is valid, S will eventually get his/her
deposit back no matter how C behaves.
 Proof Initiation Phase3: If TxClaimCommitment is includ-
ed on the blockchain with enough confirmations and
sigS([TxFine]) is received, C initiates the first partial
service proof request based on root, and gradually
initiates other partial proof requests based on chal in
a top-down manner.
Generally speaking, for each (i; j) 2 ChalIndex, C and
S make a joint deposit transaction TxProofIniti;j , which
partially specifies the requirements of sv implemen-
tation and is finally posted on the blockchain by S .
The joint deposit in TxProofIniti;j consists of the partial
service fee dCi;j B from C and the current guaranty dSi;j B
from S , where the guaranty is used as the compensation
in the Service Claim Phase. The details of TxProofIniti;j
are shown in Figure 8, in which check(x; chali;j) is
defined as follows:
– If i = `, that is, Ii;j = I`;1 = Iroot,
check(x; chal`;1) = check(x; Iroot)

= verS(H(x); root);
where x is a single variable. Obviously, what the first
partial proof needs is root but not Iroot. The other
transactions in Figure 8 will be further used in the
Service Payment Phase and the Service Claim Phase.
– If 1  i  `  1,
check(x; chali;j) = check(x; Ii;j)

=
(
true if H(x) = Ii;j ;
false if H(x) 6= Ii;j ;
where Ii;j values can be gradually obtained by C
as shown in Figure 9. In Figure 9, a checking-proof
3. For a complete service implementation proof based on BPay, the
Proof Initiation Phase and the subsequent Service Payment Phase are
sequentially executed by traversing ChalIndex.
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Step (1)
• Suppose temp = ni,j
• Choose the ni,j -th element (i, j) ∈ ChalIndex
• Sign TxProofIniti,j to get sigC([TxProofIniti,j ])
The client C Blockchain The server S
sigC([TxProofIniti,j ])
Step (2)
• If sigC([TxProofIniti,j ]) is not received until time
t− (2(nchal − ni,j) + 4)maxB , redeem Tx
S
i,j and quit
• Otherwise, sign TxProofIniti,j and broadcast it
Step (3)
• Check if TxProofIniti,j is not included on the
blockchain until time t− (2(nchal − ni,j) + 3)maxB
• If yes, immediately redeem TxCi,j and quit
• Otherwise, go to Step (5)
Step (4)
• Prepare the partial proof ServiceProofi,j
• Broadcast TxServiceFeei,j to earn d
C
i,j B
• Broadcast TxGuarantyi,j to get back d
S
i,j B
Step (5)
• Verify if ServiceProofi,j passes check before time
t− 2(nchal − ni,j + 1)maxB
• If not, go to Step (6); otherwise, go to Step (7)
Step (8)
• Broadcast TxOpen to open the claim commitment
• Then quit the protocol
Step (7)
• If ni,j = nchal, C quits
• Otherwise, set temp = ni,j + 1 and go to Step (1)
Step (6) Service Claim Phase in BPay
Fig. 9. The all-or-nothing checking-proof protocol CPAON.
protocol CPAON is performed by C and S . In CPAON,
C takes fTxCi;j ; dCi;jg(i;j)2ChalIndex as inputs and S takes
fTxSi;j ; dSi;jg(i;j)2ChalIndex as inputs. Let (i; j) be the
ni;j-th element in ChalIndex. Note that CPAON ad-
ditionally involves the Service Payment Phase and the
Service Claim Phase. We call CPAON an all-or-nothing
protocol in the sense that either the service fee and
the guaranty are redeemed by S at the same time or
more deposits of S will be paid to C.
4.2.4 Service Payment Phase
In this phase, if S can provide a valid partial proof
ServiceProofi;j before a time specified in Figure 9 to prove
that the sv implementation partially meets the requirements,
S is capable of earning the partial service fee dCi;j B of C
and get his/her current guaranty dSi;j B back by redeeming
TxProofIniti;j based on TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j ,
respectively. The partial proof ServiceProofi;j is defined as
follows:
ServiceProof
(r)
1,1
D2 D5
ServiceProof1,1 ServiceProof1,5
ServiceProof2,1 ServiceProof2,5
ServiceProof3,1
ServiceProof
(ℓ)
1,5
T
o
p
-d
ow
n
Fig. 10. The process of top-down checking and payment (` = 3).
 If 2  i  `,
ServiceProofi;j = ServiceProof
(`)
i;j k ServiceProof(r)i;j

= Ii 1;j k Ii 1;j+2i 1 :
In this case, based on the definitions of check and chal,
if ServiceProofi;j is valid, then H(ServiceProofi;j) =
chali;j . Furthermore, at least one of the following equa-
tions holds:
ServiceProof(`)i;j = chali 1;j ;
ServiceProof(r)i;j = chali 1;j+2i 1 ;
which can be specified by C based on the metadata of
T` without needing to know chal.
 If i = 1,
ServiceProof1;j = ServiceProof
(`)
1;j k ServiceProof(r)1;j

= I0;j k I0;j+1 = Dj k Dj+1:
For example, in Figure 5, I1;3 =2 chal and we have
ServiceProof3;1 = I2;1 k I2;5 = chal2;1 k chal2;5;
ServiceProof2;1 = I1;1 k I1;3 = chal1;1 k I1;3;
ServiceProof2;5 = I1;5 k I1;7 = chal1;5 k I1;7;
ServiceProof1;1 = I0;1 k I0;2 = D1 k D2 ;
ServiceProof1;5 = I0;5 k I0;6 = D5 k D6:
In the example, as shown in Figure 10, S can earn all
service fees from C by performing the top-down checking
and payment procedures.
TxOpen(in: TxClaimCommitment)
in-script: sigS([TxOpen]), ⊥, rS
out-script(body, σ): verS(body, σ)
val: d0 B
d0 B
d0 B
Fig. 11. The opening transaction TxOpen.
The details of TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j are
presented in Figure 8. After ChalIndex is traversed and
if the last proof (denoted as j0 -th proof of height 0)
ServiceProof0;j0 is valid, S earns the service fee. Further-
more, S performsCS:Open(S; C; d0; t; rS), in which S open-
s the claim commitment made in the Claim Commitment
Phase by posting the opening transaction TxOpen on the
blockchain before time t. The details of TxOpen are shown in
Figure 11. Note that TxOpen redeems TxClaimCommitment
and hence S can get his/her commitment deposit back.
Finally, S quits.
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4.2.5 Service Claim Phase
Only in the case of a partial proof failure, BPay comes to the
Service Claim Phase. Suppose for some (i0; j0) 2 ChalIndex,
S fails to provide a valid partial proof ServiceProofi0;j0 in
the Service Payment Phase before time t   2(nchal   ni0;j0 +
1)maxB specified in Figure 9. In this phase, C is able to get
enough deposit from S no matter how S behaves. Two cases
should be taken into account.
 Case 1. S refuses to pay the compensation dSi0;j0 B to C,
that is, S does not open the claim commitment made in
the Claim Commitment Phase and hence TxOpen is not
included on the blockchain before time t. In this case, C
performs CS:Fine(S; C; d0; t; rS), in which C gets the
penalty d0 B by posting the punishment transaction
TxFine on the blockchain and then quits. The detail of
TxFine is given in Figure 12.
TxFine(in: TxClaimCommitment)
in-script: sigS([TxFine]), sigC([TxFine]), ⊥
out-script(body, σ): verC(body, σ)
val: d0 B
tlock: t
d0 B
d0 B
Fig. 12. The punishment transaction TxFine.
 Case 2. S refuses to pay the penalty d0 B to C, that is,
S opens the claim commitment by posting the opening
transaction TxOpen on the blockchain before time t. In
this case, C gets both the refund dCi0;j0 B and the com-
pensation dSi0;j0 B by immediately posting the refund
transaction TxRefund and the compensation transaction
TxCompensation on the blockchain, respectively. Then
C quits. The details of TxRefund and TxCompensation
are given in Figure 8.
Now, all the technical aspects of BPay have been pre-
sented. From a holistic perspective of techniques, we give
Figure 13 to show the relationship among different modules
of BPay. Specifically, S publishes the service signature trans-
action TxServiceSig and the claim commitment transaction
TxClaimCommitment in the service implementation phase
and the service checking phase, respectively. Then, C and S
make a joint deposit transaction TxProofIniti;j in the service
checking phase. In the service payment phase, S redeem-
s TxProofIniti;j by including transactions TxServiceFeei;j
and TxGuarantyi;j on the blockchain. The generation and
redeeming of the joint deposit transaction TxProofIniti;j
is repeated until the challenge-related index ChalIndex is
traversed. Finally, if the outsourcing service is realized by
S , the opening transaction TxOpen is further recorded by S
on the blockchain in the service payment phase. Otherwise,
C can publish the refund transaction TxRefund and the com-
pensation transaction TxCompensation, or the punishment
transaction TxFine, in the service claim phase.
5 ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF BPAY
In this section, we first present the security results of BPay
in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Then, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of BPay in terms of the computation cost.
5.1 Security Analysis
Theorem 1. BPay satisfies the property of soundness if the
adopted hash function H is collision-resistant and ECDSA is
unforgeable.
Proof. According to the definition of soundness in Section
3.3, we only need to prove that if C and S are honest
and they follow the procedures of BPay, C will obtain the
required service implementation and S will get the corre-
sponding service fee at the end.
Note that the Service Claim Phase will not be performed
because S is supposed to be honest. Following the proce-
dures of BPay as illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 8, the
soundness analysis of BPay is shown as follows.
 Service Implementation Phase. In the service enforcement
procedure, S computes a signature root which is stored
on the blockchain by broadcasting the service signature
transaction TxServiceSig. Then, root is known to C and
is verified by C in the preliminary service confirmation
procedure.
 Service Checking Phase. Once a challenge chaldata is
sent by C to S , S makes a commitment CS:Commit by
posting a claim commitment transaction TxClaimCom-
mitment on the blockchain. Note that the output scrip-
t of TxClaimCommitment is out-script(body; 1; 2; x),
which is defined as
(verS(body; 1) ^H(x) = hS) _ (verS(body; 1) ^ verC(body; 2));
where hS = H(rS) and rS 2 f0; 1g is a random
value chosen by S . Obviously, if C intends to redeem
TxClaimCommitment, he has to generate an ECDSA
signature 1 on body such that verS(body; 

1) returns
“true”. However, it is infeasible because ECDSA is
unforgeable.
Subsequently, C and S perform the all-or-nothing
checking-proof protocol CPAON, which has a sequence
of rounds corresponding to the index set ChalIndex
derived from chaldata. In the proof initiation phase, for
(i; j) 2 ChalIndex, C and S jointly generate a proof
initiation transaction TxProofIniti;j which specifies the
requirements of the service implementation. As illus-
trated in Figure 8, the output scripts of TxProofIniti;j are
out-script1(body; ; x) and out-script2(body; ; x),
which are the same and have the form below
(verC(body; ) ^H(x) = hS) _ (verS(body; ) ^ check(x; chali;j))
where chali;j = Ii;j is defined in the service
enforcement procedure and the checking function
check(x; chali;j) is defined as follows.
– If i = `, that is, Ii;j = I`;1 = Iroot,
check(x; chal`;1) = check(x; Iroot)

=verS(H(x); root); (1)
where x is a single variable.
– If 1  i  `  1,
check(x; chali;j) = check(x; Ii;j)

=
(
true if H(x) = Ii;j ;
false if H(x) 6= Ii;j : (2)
Note that C can gradually specify the value chali;j in
the subsequent Service Payment Phase based on CPAON.
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TxRefund(in: TxProofIniti,j(1))
TxGuarantyi,j(in: TxProofIniti,j(2))
TxProofIniti,j(in: Tx
C
i,j , Tx
S
i,j)
TxServiceFeei,j(in: TxProofIniti,j(1))
TxCompensation(in: TxProofIniti,j(2))
dCi,j B d
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i,j B
dCi,j B d
S
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dCi,j B d
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i,j B
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TxServiceSig(in: TxSsig)
dsig B σroot
TxClaimCommitment(in:TxS0 )
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Fig. 13. The technical framework of BPay. For clearness, the blue dotted line is used to specify a scope.
 Service Payment Phase. In this phase, TxProofIniti;j has
been recorded by S on the blockchain. It follows from
the output script of TxProofIniti;j that if C intends to
redeem TxProofIniti;j , he needs to find a value x such
that verC(body; ) ^ H(x) = hS evaluates to “true”.
Because hS = H(rS) is computed by S , it is infeasible
for C to find x 6= rS such that H(x) = H(rS) if H is
a collision-resistant hash function4.
On the other hand, if S intends to redeem TxProofIniti;j ,
he needs to find a value x such that verS(body; ) ^
check(x; chali;j) evaluates to “true”, where chali;j is
specified by C and S in the Service Checking Phase.
Now, we show that S can find a valid x to successfully
redeem TxProofIniti;j if and only if he correctly imple-
ments the outsourcing service. Based on the value of i,
two cases should be taken into consideration.
Case I. i = `. In this case, suppose S finds x such that
verS(H(x); root) returns “true”. Based on Equation
(1), there are two cases:
– If x = rS , then x is a valid partial proof, which
satisfies the requirements of soundness.
– If x 6= rS , we consider two cases:
? H(x) = hS , which means a collision (rS ; x)
of H is found. However, if H is collision-
resistant, S cannot succeed in this case.
? H(x) 6= hS , which means a signature forgery
(H(x); root) of ECDSA is found. However,
because ECDSA is unforgeable, S cannot suc-
ceed in this case.
Case II. 1  i  `   1. In this case, suppose S finds
x such that check(x; Ii;j) returns “true”. Based on
Equation (2), we knowH(x) = Ii;j , which means x
is a valid partial proof and is known to C. According
4. C cannot get rS from hS because the one-way property is a basic
requirement of hash functions.
to the definition of ServiceProofi;j in the Service
Payment Phase in Section 4.2, we have
x = ServiceProofi;j = Ii 1;j k Ii 1;j+2i 1 ;
= chali 1;j k chali 1;j+2i 1 :
In particular, according to Step (4) of CPAON as
shown in Figure 9, we consider:
– i 6= 1. In this case, x can be used by C to spec-
ify the output script out-script1(body; ; x) of
TxProofIniti;j in the next round of CPAON in the
Service Checking Phase.
– i = 1. In this case, x is the original service-related
data, and we have
x = ServiceProof1;j = I0;j k I0;j+1 = Dj k Dj+1:
It’s noted that if S does not implement the out-
sourcing service for C and he can find x such that
x 6= ServiceProofi;j and H(x) = Ii;j , which means
a collision (x;ServiceProofi;j) of H is found. How-
ever, it is impossible if H is collision-resistant.
Based on the above analysis, BPay satisfies the property of
soundness if H is collision-resistant and ECDSA is unforge-
able.
Theorem 2. Based on the collision-resistance of H and the
unforgeability of ECDSA, BPay satisfies the property of robust
fairness without needing a third-party.
Proof. As mentioned in Section 3.3, no private channels
are required in BPay. Therefore, eavesdropping attacks and
malleability attacks may be made by a malicious party to
undermine the fairness for the honest party. In the follow-
ing, we first prove the robust fairness for C against malicious
S , and then consider the robust fairness for S in the case of
malicious C.
Case 1. Suppose C is honest and S is malicious. In this
case, S aims to get the service fee from C without providing
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a valid service implementation proof in terms of the require-
ments specified by C before time t   2maxB . At the same
time, S is reluctant to pay compensation and penalty to C.
Assume that C does not get a valid service implementation
proof from S in terms of his/her requirements before time
t  2maxB , which means there exists an invalid partial ser-
vice implementation proof ServiceProofi;j for some index
(i; j). Hence, the joint deposit transaction TxProofIniti;j
cannot be redeemed by S based on TxServiceFeei;j and
TxGuarantyi;j until time t 2(nchal ni;j+1)maxB spec-
ified in Figure 9 in the service payment phase. According to
the definitions of check and ServiceProofi;j in Section 4.2,
we know:
 If (i; j) = (`; 1), S cannot get the partial service
fee dC`;1 B from C unless S is able to forge an ECDSA
signature.
 If (i; j) 6= (`; 1), S cannot get the partial service fee
dCi;j B from C unless S is able to find a collision of the
hash function H .
Furthermore, S may make malleability attacks by eaves-
dropping transactions on the public channel. However, the
attacks are meaningless because the transactions involved in
BPay are posted on the blockchain in order and C is still able
to claim enough compensation or penalty from S . Please
refer to Figure 8 for more details.
Specifically, if S refuses to pay the compensation dSi;j B
to C, which means S does not open the claim commitment
made in the claim commitment phase by broadcasting Tx-
Open based on CS:Open before time t, C performs CS:Fine,
in which C gets the penalty d0 B with d0  dCi;j + dSi;j
by posting the punishment transaction TxFine on the
blockchain. If S refuses to pay the penalty to C, which means
S opens the claim commitment by performing CS:Open to
post TxOpen on the blockchain before time t, C can claim
both the refund dCi;j B and the compensation d
S
i;j B by
posting TxRefund and TxCompensation on the blockchain,
respectively. Please refer to Figure 8 and Figure 9 for more
details. Accordingly, in any case, if malicious S fails to
provide a valid service implementation proof, C is able to
claim enough compensation besides the service fee refund
or penalty from S no matter how S behaves.
Case 2. Suppose S is honest and C is malicious. In this
case, C aims to obtain a valid service implementation proof
in terms of his/her requirements before time t   2maxB
without paying the corresponding service fee to S . Assume
that S provides a valid service implementation proof in
terms of the requirements of C before time t   2maxB . It
follows that for each (i; j) 2 ChalIndex, the partial service
implementation proof ServiceProofi;j is valid. According
to the details of BPay, for each chali;j 2 chal, C only puts
service fees in the generation of the joint deposit transaction
TxProofIniti;j , which can be successfully redeemed by S in
the service payment phase based on TxServiceFeei;j and
TxGuarantyi;j before time t  2(nchal   ni;j + 1)maxB only
if ServiceProofi;j is valid. In fact, malicious C may try to
eavesdrop TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j on the public
channel to get the service proof ServiceProofi;j together
with sigS([TxServiceFeei;j]) and sigS([TxGuarantyi;j]). Af-
ter that, C mauls the joint deposit transaction TxProofIniti;j
to prevent S from earning the corresponding service fee. As
we know, however, the service payment phase is behind the
proof initiation phase in BPay, hence the malleability attack
is infeasible.
On the other hand, malicious C may try to claim com-
pensation or penalty from S after ensuring that the service
proof is valid in terms of his/her requirements. Obviously,
it is infeasible for C to claim compensation from S because
TxGuarantyi;j has been posted on the blockchain. In particu-
lar, based on the definitions of check and ServiceProofi;j in
Section 4.2, C cannot redeem TxProofIniti;j before S unless
he/she finds a collision ofH or forges an ECDSA signature.
According to the service payment phase of BPay,CS:Open is
immediately performed by S to open the claim commitment
and hence to get the punishment deposit back before time
t. In this case, from the property of transaction lock-time, it
follows that C cannot get a penalty from S even if he/she
can make successful malleability attacks.
Therefore, if H is collision-resistant and ECDSA is un-
forgeable, the robust fairness for C and S is ensured in BPay
without needing a third-party.
5.2 Computation Cost Evaluation
BPay is the first outsourcing service payment framework
based on blockchain, without needing any third party. The
performance is related to the concrete applications of BPay.
For example, as shown in the Supplemental Material C, the
blockchain-based SSE scheme from BPay is very efficient
because the data tree height is ` = 1. In this section, we
evaluate the performance of BPay in a general manner,
that is, the number of challenge blocks and the height of
the data tree are dynamic. The most common computation
for C and S are hashing and ECDSA signature operations.
Considering that the computation cost of a hashing is far
less than that of an ECDSA signature, we take ECDSA
signature into account in the following. In our experiments,
we evaluate the computation time of the ECDSA signature
used in transactions on a virtual machine (3.6 GHz single-
core processor and 6 GB DDR3-1600 RAM memory) based
on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and OpenSSL 1.0.2g. In particular, a
specific elliptic curve called secp256k1 with the equation
y2 = x3 + 7 is adopted, which is used by Bitcoin and
can also be used in Ethereum. Additionally, we display the
computation time with data trees of height 7, 10, 13, and
16, respectively. In any case, the number of challenge data
blocks can reach 100 (< 27).
hr
ha
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
hb
hc hd he hf
challenge data
hr
ha
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
hb
hc hd he hf
involved in service checking and service payment
The Best Case The Worst Case
Fig. 14. Examples of the best case and worst case of challenges in BPay.
In BPay, if S is honest, the client only participates in
creating the transaction TxProofIniti;j in the Service Checking
Phase. In this case, the server participates in the creation of
TxServiceSig, TxClaimCommitment, TxOpen, TxProofIniti;j ,
TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j . Note that, even if
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(c) The claim time with a malicious server
Fig. 15. The computation time of the client in BPay
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(b) The worst case
Fig. 16. The computation time of the server in BPay
TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j are combined, the num-
ber of ECDSA signatures is not reduced. In addition, the
creation of TxFine also needs a signature of the server. For
the client, the number of ECDSA signatures increases in
the same way as the increase of TxProofIniti;j . According
to the position of challenge data blocks, we take two cases
into consideration, that is, the best case and the worst case.
An example of T3 is shown in Figure 14. In the best case,
the challenge data blocks are successively on the left end
of leaves. In Figure 14, the challenge data blocks D1 and
D2 add 3 signature operations for the client. The number
of signatures for the server is 13. To clearly present the
computation time of BPay, the vertical axis adopts the log
scale in Figure 15 and Figure 16. The computation time of
the client and the server in the best case are presented in
Figure 15(a) and Figure 16(a), respectively. In the worst case,
the challenge data blocks are sequentially located at both
ends of leaves. The challenge data blocks are D1 and D8, as
shown in Figure 14, and the client has to perform 5 ECDSA
signature operations. Similarly, the number of signatures for
the server is 19. Generally, the computation time of the client
and the server in the worst case are presented in Figure
15(b) and Figure 16(b), respectively. On the other hand,
if the server is malicious and the commitment deposit is
refunded, the client only needs one ECDSA signature in the
Service Claim Phase. The corresponding claim time for the
client is presented in Figure 15(c). Obviously, as the first
fair payment scheme without needing any third party for
outsourcing services in cloud computing, BPay is efficient
in terms of the computation cost.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced BPay, an outsourcing service
payment framework based on blockchain in cloud comput-
ing. To be specific, we proposed the system architecture,
definition, adversary model and design goals, and described
the design details of BPay. Our security analysis indicated
that BPay achieves soundness and robust fairness if the hash
function is collision-resistant and ECDSA is unforgeable.
Our experimental results showed that BPay is efficient in
terms of the computation cost. In future research, it would
be interesting to address the issue of payment fairness
based on blockchain technologies in more complex cloud
applications such as attribute-based data sharing.
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THE SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL TO BPAY
BPay is the first outsourcing service fair payment scheme
without any third party. In this section, we present the
supplemental material to “BPay: Outsourcing Service Fair
Payment based on Blockchain and its Applications in Cloud
Computing (DOI: 10.1109/TSC.2018.2864191)”. First, the
compatibility and transactions of BPay are discussed in the
Supplemental Material A. Then, several decentralized ap-
plications of BPay in cloud computing, including dynamic
provable data possession (DPDP) and searchable symmetric
encryption (SSE) as storage service and outsourcing compu-
tation as computation service, are given in the Supplemental
Material B.
A. COMPATIBILITY AND TRANSACTIONS OF BPAY
A.1. Compatibility of BPay
Theorem 3. BPay is compatible with the Bitcoin blockchain and
the Ethereum blockchain.
Proof. It is necessary to show that the opcodes involved
in BPay are currently allowed by the Bitcoin blockchain
and the Ethereum blockchain. As we know, the Bitcoin
blockchain allows using a scripting system for transactions.
The Bitcoin script is simple, stack-based and purposefully
not Turing-complete, with no loops. In particular, in order
to remove out of the concern that clients might have bugs
in their implementation, many opcodes are disabled in the
latest version of Bitcoin and the operations of slight com-
plexity are not supported [43]. Unlike the Bitcoin protocol,
Ethereum is a programmable blockchain and it allows users
to create their own operations of any complexity they wish
[16], [44], [45]. In other words, The Ethereum blockchain
is more flexible than the Bitcoin blockchain. Therefore, if it
is showed that BPay is compatible with opcodes currently
allowed by the Bitcoin blockchain, then BPay is compatible
with opcodes allowed by the Ethereum blockchain.
Now, according to the design of BPay, we show that it is
compatible with opcodes [43], which are currently allowed
by the Bitcoin blockchain. In fact, the transactions involved
in BPay mainly include TxServiceSig, TxClaimCommitment,
TxOpen, TxFine, TxRefund, TxCompensation and
fTxProofIniti;j ; TxServiceFeei;j ; TxGuarantyi;jg(i;j)2ChalIndex:
Please find the details of these transactions in Figure 6,
Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 11 and Figure 12. Obviously, based
on the definitions of check and chal, the operations required
for generating these transactions only includes the hashing
operation, the ECDSA verification, and time-lock, which are
allowed by Bitcoin [43]. Note that the transaction inputs are
locally generated and time-lock mechanisms in Ethereum
can be realized based on the Ethereum Alarm Clock [42].
Therefore, BPay is compatible with the Bitcoin blockchain
and hence the Ethereum blockchain.
A.2. Transactions of BPay
As for BPay, in the Service Implementation Phase, only one
transaction TxServiceSig is required. In the Service Checking
Phase, transactions TxClaimCommitment and TxProofIniti;j
are involved. In the Service Payment Phase, transactions Tx-
Open, TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j are needed. In the
Service Claim Phase, either the transaction TxFine or transac-
tions TxRefund and TxCompensation are created. It’s noted
that TxServiceFeei;j and TxGuarantyi;j can be replaced
with one transaction because they only need signatures of
the server. Similarly, TxRefund and TxCompensation can
also be combined into one transaction. The number of
transactions with subscript (i; j) is affected by the height of
the data tree and the challenge data blocks. In the following,
according to the position of challenge data blocks, we take
two cases into consideration.
The Best Case. The challenge data blocks are successively
on the left end of leaves. Considering the service data tree T`
of height `. As shown in Figure 17, we construct a increment
sequence TxNum which consists of 2` nonnegative integers
and is divided into ` sub-sequences P0 = f0; 0g, P1 = f1; 0g
and Pk = fk; 0;P1;P2;    ;Pk 1g for 2  k  `   1. For
conciseness of description, we introduce several symbols.
 TxNum(i): The i-th element ofTxNum. It represents the
number of new transactions with subscripts, such as the
proof initiation transactions, which are specified by the
i-th challenge data block Di. 5
 TxNum(i1; i2) = fTxNum(i)gi1ii2 .
 fPk ! Pig: The first element of Pi in Pk.
Suppose C sends a challenge chaldata = (1; 2;    ; Nc) with
Nc  2` to S in the Challenge Generation Phase. Then, the
total number of new specific transactions due to chaldata
is ` +
PNc
i=1TxNum(i). Now, we show how to compute the
number TxNum(nc) of new specific transactions due to the
nc-th challenge data block Dnc with 1  nc  Nc. Suppose
nc = 2
kc + 2kc 1 +    + 2k1 + 2k0 , where ki > ki 1 for
1  i  c and k0 has value of 0 or 1. We consider two cases:
 Case 1. k0 = 0, which means nc is odd. In this case,
TxNum(nc) 6= 0 and its value is
fPkc ! Pkc 1 !    ! Pk1g:
 Case 2. k0 = 1, which means nc is even. In this case,
TxNum(nc) = 0 and it is closely behind the element
fPkc ! Pkc 1 !    ! Pk1g:
Take T4 as an example. ThenTxNum = fP0;P1;P2;P3g and
P0 = f0; 0g = TxNum(1 : 2);
P1 = f1; 0g = TxNum(3 : 4);
P2 = f2; 0;P1g = f2; 0; f1; 0gg = TxNum(5 : 8);
P3 = f3; 0;P1;P2g = f3; 0; f1; 0g; f2; 0; f1; 0ggg = TxNum(9 : 16):
For nc = 7. Because 7 = 22 + 21 + 20, the number of
new specific transactions due to D7 is TxNum(7) = fP2 !
P1g = 1. In the case of D14, 14 = 23 + 22 + 21, therefore the
number is TxNum(14) = 0 closely after fP3 ! P2g.
The Worst Case The challenge data blocks are sequential-
ly located at both ends of leaves. As shown in Table 3, we
present the correspondence between the number of new
specific transactions, denoted as numnt, and the number of
challenged data blocks, denoted as numcb. To be specific,
a pair (numnt; numcb) means that there are numcb data
blocks, each of which will add numnt new transactions if
challenged. In Table 3, the total number of challenge data
5. Obviously, the first challenge data block D1 newly adds ` transac-
tions. For consistency of the description, we use TxNum(1) = 0 as the
increment due to D1 on the basis of `.
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∆TxNum={{0, 0},{1, 0},{2, 0,P1},{3, 0,P1,P2}, · · · , {k − 1, 0,P1,P2, · · · ,Pk−2}, {k, 0,P1,P2, · · · ,Pk−1}, · · · , {ℓ− 1, 0,P1,P2, · · · ,Pℓ−2}}
P1 P2 P3P0 Pk−1 Pk Pℓ−1
· · · · · ·
Fig. 17. The increment sequence of transaction number for BPay in the best case.
blocks is 1 +
P` 2
i=0 2
i = 2` 1. In other words, the other
2` 1 = 2`   2` 1 data blocks will not add new transactions
when they are challenged. Suppose C sends a challenge
chaldata = (n1; n2;    ; nc)with c  2` to S in the Challenge
Generation Phase. Based on Table 3, we compute
numk

= 1  `+
kX
i=1
2i 1  (`  i) = 2k  (`  k + 1)  1:
For k = blog cc. Then, the maximum number nummax of
new specific transactions due to chaldata in the worst case
is computed based on the following Equation (3).
nummax = numblog cc + (c  2blog cc)  (`  (blog cc+ 1))
= 2blog cc  (`  blog cc+ 1)  1
+(c  2blog cc)  (`  blog cc   1)
= 2blog cc+1   c  blog cc+ (`  1)c  1: (3)
Take T3 as an example. As shown in Figure 14, chaldata =
(1; 8) and c = 2. According to Equation (3), nummax = 5,
which means 5 specific transactions are newly added due to
two challenge data blocks in the worst case.
B. DECENTRALIZED APPLICATIONS OF BPAY
BPay is the first outsourcing service fair payment scheme
without any third party. In this section, we show some
decentralized applications based on BPay, including DPDP
and SSE as storage service and outsourcing computation as
computation service.
B.1. Blockchain-based DPDP
As for sv=DPDP, besides the initial data storage, we further
consider data update including the types of data insertion,
data modification, and data deletion. Generally, in the case
of data update, C first performs the Challenge Generation
Subphase of the Service Checking Phase according to the type
of data update, so that he/she can get update-related hash
values in the Service Payment Phase used for checking the
update in the Preliminary Service Confirmation procedure.
Then, in Service Subscription, C sends an update request
to S based on any existing data update methods suitable
for Merkle trees. Finally, S performs the update in Service
Enforcement and C ensures the update in Preliminary Service
Confirmation. In the following, based on several examples,
we present the details of DPDP in terms of the type of data
update.
B.1.1. Data Insertion
As shown in Figure 18, suppose C wants to insert D2 and
D5 after D2 and D5, respectively. The following procedures
are performed.
 C sets chaldata = f1; 6g in the Challenge Generation
Phase.
hr
ha
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
hb
hc hd he hf
h∗r
h∗a
D1 D3 D4 D6 D7 D8
h∗
b
h∗c hd h
∗
e hf
D2 D
∗
2
D5 D
∗
5
h∗g h
∗
h
Insert D∗
i
after Di for i = 2, 5
challenge data
Fig. 18. An example of insertion update of DPDP.
 In the Service Payment Phase, C sequentially obtains
hd, hf , (D1; D2) and (D5; D6) from ServiceProofa,
ServiceProofb, ServiceProofc and ServiceProofe, re-
spectively.
 In Service Subscription, C constructs an update request
message update = (I; (2; D2); (5; D5)) and sends it to
S , where I denotes the data insertion operation.
 In Service Enforcement, S can use any existing data
insertion methods suitable for Merkle trees, and store
the signature root of h

r on the blockchain as before.
 In Preliminary Service Confirmation, C first ensures the
validity of root based on the values from the Service
Payment Phase. Then, C updates the previous metadata
based on update.
B.1.2. Data Modification
The procedures are similar to those in Data Insertion, except
that the modification operation is performed by S in Service
Enforcement. An example of modification is given in Figure
19. Note that, in the Service Payment Phase, C sequentially
obtains hd, he, (D1; D2) and (D7; D8) from ServiceProofa,
ServiceProofb, ServiceProofc and ServiceProoff , respective-
ly.
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D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
hb
hc hd he hf
h∗r
h∗a
D1 D3 D4 D6 D
∗
7
D8
h∗
b
h∗c hd he h
∗
f
D∗
2
D5
Modify Di to D
∗
i
for i = 2, 7
challenge data
Fig. 19. An example of modification update of DPDP.
B.1.3. Data Deletion
The procedures are similar to those in Data Insertion, except
that the deletion operation is performed by S in Service
Enforcement. An example of deletion update is given in
Figure 20. It’s noted that in the Service Payment Phase, C
sequentially obtains hd, he, D1 and D8 from ServiceProofa,
ServiceProofb, ServiceProofc and ServiceProoff , respective-
ly.
Remark 1. The blockchain-based DPDP scheme is capable of
realizing public verification. Obviously, C can delegate any one
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TABLE 3
The number of new transactions specified by the challenge data blocks of BPay in the worst case.
Items Correspondence
numnt ` `  1 `  2    `  (k   1) `  k    1
numcd 1 = 20 20 = 21   20 21 = 22   21    2k 2 = 2k 1   2k 2 2k 1 = 2k   2k 1    2` 2
hr
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hd he
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Fig. 20. An example of deletion update of DPDP.
to perform the data integrity checking based on his/her metadata,
which will not leak information on secret keys and data plaintexts.
B.2. BC-SSE: Blockchain-based SSE
In this section, we propose a blockchain-based SSE scheme
by adopting BPay, denoted as BC-SSE, in which S can earn
the service fee from C if and only if C gets a valid SSE service
from S . We first propose a publicly verifiable SSE scheme
(PV-SSE) based on [9], [10], and then transform it to BC-SSE
in terms of BPay. Note that, based on the SSE scheme [9],
the verifiable SSE scheme [10], denoted as V-SSE, further
realizes verification of search results by designing indexes
based on MAC with a secret key. However, V-SSE cannot
be directly used in BPay in that the verification requires
the MAC secret key. If S gets the secret key, he/she can
generate “search results” arbitrarily and ensure they can
pass the verification. The difference between our PV-SSE
and V-SSE lies in that the index is built based on ECDSA
instead of MAC. Due to space limitation, we do not present
it in detail. Please refer to [10] for more details. In PV-
SSE, although S is able to publicly check the search results
based on the public key of C, he/she cannot generate valid
results arbitrarily because of the unforgeability of ECDSA.
It directly follows from the unforgeability of ECDSA and
MAC that the security of PV-SSE is the same to that of V-
SSE.
Now, we present BC-SSE based on BPay and PV-SSE. On
the basis of the original procedures of BPay, C and S further
do the following.
 System Setup Phase: C runs Gen(1k) to get secret key K ,
in which the secret key component of MAC is replaced
by that of ECDSA.
 Service Implementation Phase:
– Service Subscription: For consistency of notations used
in BPay, we useF to represent a file collection and the
corresponding ciphertext is D. C runs Enc(K;F ;W)
to get (I;D) and sends it to S , whereW is the set of
keywords and I is the index array. Let data1 = D.
– Service Enforcement: As before.
– Preliminary Service Confirmation: As before.
 Service Checking Phase:
– Challenge Generation Phase: At first, according to the
trapdoor algorithm Trapdoor(K;!), C sends T! to
S , where ! is a keyword and T! is the trapdoor
associated with !. Then, S runs Search(I;D; T!) to
get (D!; tag!). Here, D! consists of ciphertexts in D
of which the corresponding plaintexts contain !, and
tag! comprise the tag components ftag!;jg1jjFj
associated with ! in I . S sends D! to C.
– Claim Commitment Phase: As before.
– Proof Initiation Phase: According to the ECDSA ver-
ification used in Verify, C and S can jointly create
TxProofInit1;1. Specifically, they put verC(addr!;j k
Dj ; !;j) for 1  j  jFj in the output script, where
addr!;j is a value of a pseudo-random permutation
associated with tag!;j , Dj is a ciphertext in D! ,
and !;j is a single variable. Note that S should
provide !;j = tag!;j in the Service Payment Phase
and addr!;j k Dj is computed locally.
 Service Payment Phase: S can earn the service fee if and
only if he/she can provide valid ftag!;jg1jjFj.
 Service Claim Phase: As before.
Remark 2. In BC-SSE, the all-or-nothing checking-proof protocol
CPAON is one-round because the search results are checked in a
single interaction. Hence, BC-SSE is very efficient and only one
proof initiation transaction exists in BPay.
B.3. Blockchain-based Outsourcing Computation
In this section, we show the application of BPay in outsourc-
ing computation, and propose a blockchain-based outsourc-
ing computation scheme. Based on the definition in [11],
a distributed computation involves a function, a screener
and a payment scheme. However, a trusted third-party
is introduced in [11]. In our scheme, we realize both the
screener and the payment on blockchain and no third-party
is required. Formally, let f be a one-way function from X
to Y , denoted as f : X 7! Y . Suppose y = f(x) for
x 2 X . Note that multiple such x may exist. Given f and
y only, the object of the computation is to discover all such
x by exhaustive search of the domain X . According to the
design of BPay, we show the outsourcing of inverting a hash
function as an example. Based on the original procedures of
BPay, C and S further do the following.
 System Setup Phase: C specifies a task task = (f;X; y),
where X = fx1; x2;    ; xNg.
 Service Implementation Phase:
– Service Subscription: C sends task to S .
– Service Enforcement: For 1  i  N , S computes yi =
f(xi). Without loss of generality, suppose
fx 2 Xjf(x) = yg = fx1; x2;    ; x2`g=X;
where `  logN . S constructs a Merkle tree based on
X as before and sends ` to C.
– Preliminary Service Confirmation: C stores `.
 Service Checking Phase:
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– Challenge Generation Phase: As before.
– Claim Commitment Phase: As before.
– Proof Initiation Phase: For i = `, C and S jointly create
TxProofInit`;1 based on y by putting H(x0k) = y
 for
k 2 chaldata in the output script, where the value of
x0k is from xk provided by S in the Service Payment
Phase. That is, the service proof provided by S in the
Service Payment Phase should satisfy the correctness
requirement besides check. For i 6= `, C and S do as
before. That is, the service proof provided by S in the
Service Payment Phase should satisfy check.
 Service Payment Phase: For i = `, S provides
fxkgk2chaldata besides ServiceProof`;1. For i 6= `, S does
as before.
 Service Claim Phase: As before.
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